Criminal Law—Perjury—Depositions—Suggested Legislation by Rupp, John N.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 13 Number 4 
11-1-1938 
Criminal Law—Perjury—Depositions—Suggested Legislation 
John N. Rupp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John N. Rupp, Comment, Criminal Law—Perjury—Depositions—Suggested Legislation, 13 Wash. L. Rev. & 
St. B.J. 319 (1938). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol13/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
COMMENTS
suggested that those desiring to attend the banquet make their
reservations as early as possible. Reservations may now be made
by communicating with the secretary of the Law School.
SUPPLEMENT TO SHEPARD'S WASHINGTON CITATION
The law library now maintains a card index supplementing the
last paper supplement to Shepard's Washington Citation. Attor-





By an amended information, in a recent Washington case, re-
spondent was charged with the crime of perjury in the first degree,
the information alleging that respondent came before a notary
public for the purpose of giving his deposition which was to be
used in a pending civil case, that he was sworn according to law
to tell the truth, and that he thereupon testified falsely with the
intent that his testimony as written in the deposition be used in
that civil case. It affirmatively appeared, both from the allegations
of the original information and from the state's admission in open
court, that the deposition was never subscribed by respondent. The
superior court sustained respondent's demurrer and dismissed the
prosecution. Upon the state's appeal, it was held that the demur-
rer had been properly sustained.'
The decision is founded upon Remington's Revised Statutes,
Section 2356,1a which relates to perjury and which provides:
"The making of a deposition, certificate or affidavit
shall be deemed to be complete when it is subscribed and
sworn to or. affirmed by the defendant with intent that it
be uttered or published as true." (Italics mine.)
The reasoning of the majority opinion, in brief, is that this
statute means that perjury cannot be based upon a false deposition
unless that deposition be subscribed by the defendant.
The dissenting opinion is based upon the concept that, even
though the deposition itself is not complete, still the defendant
knowingly and deliberately testified falsely under oath before the
notary in aid of a pending judicial proceeding, and this false
swearing is perjury under the general statute defining the offense.
That statute is dissected and quoted as follows:
"Every person who, in any action, proceeding, hearing
'State v. Ledford, 95 Wash. Dec. 490, 81 P. (2d) 830 (1938). (En banc;
two of the judges dissented.)
IaLaws 1909, C. 249, § 104.
COMMENTS
tion states, ". . . subscribed and sworn to or affirmed ... "
Thus, in Minnesota, the deposition, for purposes of the perjury
statutes, is complete when it is subscribed, or when it is sworn to,
or when it is affirmed, in each case with the requisite intent. In
Washington, it is complete only when subscribed and sworn to, or
when it is subscribed and affirmed, with the necessary intent.
Upon reflection, the instant case is seen to be an excellent illus-
tration of the inferiority of Remington's Revised Statutes Section
2356, to statutes of the California or the Minnesota types.
The 1939 session of the legislature should amend Section 2356
as suggested by this comment in order to remedy the present defect.
JoHN N. Rupp.
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS AS COMMUNITY
PROPERTY
The past year has witnessed the closing by judicial decision of
two important gaps in the Washington community property law,
both relating to life insurance proceeds. The first case in point
of time, Occidental Life Insurance Company v. Powers,' announced
the rule that where the husband changes the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy which is the property of the community because
issued on the life of the husband during marriage and paid for
with community funds, without the consent or knowledge of the
wife, the former beneficiary, the attempted gift by the husband is
ineffective and the wife may recover the entire proceeds.
The second case, In re Coffey's Estate,' solves a problem not
touched upon in the Powers case, namely the status of a policy
issued before marirage to a husband, the premiums for which are
paid partly by the separate funds of the husband and partly by
community funds. There the policy was held to be community
property in the proportion that premiums were paid by community
funds. The wife's one-half share of the community proportion so
determined was held not subject to the state inheritance tax.
Most of the community property jurisdictions are in accord with
respect to two other common insurance situations. By statute
in Washington 3 and by judicial decision in other community prop-
erty states,4 if the wife is the designated beneficiary of any life
insurance policy, the proceeds go to her separate estate, not to the
community estate. Conversely, it is the settled rule of these juris-
dictions that the proceeds are community property where the hus-
192 Wash. 475, 74 P. (2d) 27 (1937).
295 Wash. Dec. 315, 81 P. (2d) 283 (1938).
'REM. RcV. STAT. § 7230-1.
'Succession of Bofenschen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877); Succession of
Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874); Succession of Clark, 27 La. Ann. 269
(1875); Davis v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 105 S. W.
(2d) 695 (1937); Johnson v. Cole (Tex. Civ. App.), 258 S. W. 850 (1924);
In re Dobbel's Estate 104 Cal. 432, 38 Pac. 87 (1894); In re Castagnola's
Estate, 68 Ca. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924); In re Lissner's Estate,
- Cal. -, 81 P. (2d) 448 (1938).
